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Why Separate Church and State?
In 1947, when the Supreme Court first considered the issue ofgovernment aid to religion, it echoed the words of Thomas
Jefferson and declared that “[t]he First Amendment has erected
a wall between church and state.  That wall must be kept high
and impregnable.”1  For several decades after this, a majority of
the Court unquestionably was committed to strict separation of
religion and government.2  The Court thus developed Establish-
ment Clause doctrines that limited religion’s presence in govern-
* Alston & Bird Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke University.  I
served as counsel in the Supreme Court for Thomas Van Orden in Van Orden v.
Perry , discussed in this Essay.
1 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
2 Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism , 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
230, 233-37 (1994) (stating that strict separation was the dominant theory from 1947
to 1980).
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ment—such as in forbidding prayers in public schools3—and
government’s presence in religion—such as in limiting aid to pa-
rochial schools.4
Now, however, we are on the verge of a radical change in the
law of the Establishment Clause.  Of all the areas of constitu-
tional law, the Establishment Clause seems the one where signifi-
cant change is most likely.  There now are five Justices—Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Al-
ito—who seem ready and even eager to overrule decades of pre-
cedent with regard to the Establishment Clause.
For example, in the most recent Supreme Court decision en-
forcing the Establishment Clause—McCreary County v. ACLU
of Kentucky5 —the majority was comprised of Justices Stevens,
O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  With Justice
O’Connor replaced by Justice Alito, there will likely be a major
change in the law of the Establishment Clause.
In this Essay, I make two points.  First, I describe how the law
is likely to change.  Second, I argue that these changes are unde-
sirable and address the basic question of why the Establishment
Clause should be interpreted as creating a wall separating church
and state.
In March 2005, I argued Van Orden v. Perry6 in the United
States Supreme Court, a case that involved a challenge to a six-
foot-high Ten Commandments monument that sits between the
Texas State Capitol and the Texas Supreme Court.  I was startled,
both before and after the argument, at the number of liberals
who criticized bringing this lawsuit.  Time and again, I heard the
refrain, “What difference does it make if this monument is there?
Challenging the monument just provides a rallying point for the
religious right and hurts progressives.”  I vehemently disagree
with this view.  I deeply believe that our government must be
secular and that the presence of sectarian religious symbols on
3 See, e.g. , Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962) (banning prayer in public schools).
4 See, e.g. , Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
5 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005) (holding that the posting of the Ten Commandments in
government buildings for the purpose of advancing religion violates the Establish-
ment Clause).
6 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (holding that a six-feet-high, three-and-one-half-feet-wide
Ten Commandments monument between the Texas State Capitol and the Texas Su-
preme Court does not violate the Establishment Clause).
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government property is incompatible with the Establishment
Clause.  In Part II, I seek to explain why.
I
THE COMING REVOLUTION IN ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
Conservatives long have lamented the Supreme Court’s deci-
sions that interpret the Establishment Clause as limiting aid to
parochial schools and prohibiting prayer in public schools.  Now
it appears that they have a majority to reverse these decisions.
For the last thirty years, the Court has followed a test in Estab-
lishment Clause cases that was announced in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man .7  In Lemon , the Court declared, “First, the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or pri-
mary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits relig-
ion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government
entanglement with religion.’”8  A law is unconstitutional if it fails
any prong of the Lemon  test.9
Although there have been many cases where the Court de-
cided Establishment Clause cases without applying this test,10 it
has been frequently used.  And while several Justices have criti-
cized the test and called for it to be overruled, this has not oc-
curred.11  Indeed, Justice Scalia, the primary advocate for
overruling the Lemon  test, colorfully lamented its survival and
analogized it to:
[a] ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in
its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and
buried . . . .  It is there to scare us . . . when we wish it to do so,
7 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
8 Id.  at 612-13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674
(1970)).
9 Id.  at 612.
10 See, e.g. , Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (finding that creating a
school district contiguous with a religious community violates the Establishment
Clause); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (allowing nativity scene on govern-
ment property); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (allowing government pay-
ment of a legislative chaplain because of the practice’s history).
11 Justice Scalia has expressly called for the overruling of the Lemon  test. See,
e.g. , Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-99
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).  For a recent case where the majority approvingly cited to and used the
Lemon  test, see Lamb’s Chapel , 508 U.S. at 395-97 (majority opinion) (applying the
Lemon  test and concluding that the Establishment Clause was not violated by al-
lowing religious groups to use school facilities during evenings and weekends).
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but we can command it to return to the tomb at will.  When we
wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it, when we
wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely.12
In recent years, four Justices have indicated that they want to
overrule the Lemon  test—Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas.13  These four Justices have expressed a desire for a new
test that allows much more government aid to religion and much
more of a religious presence in government.  They call for an “ac-
commodationist” approach where the government would be
deemed to violate the Establishment Clause only if it literally
creates a church, favors one religion over others, or coerces relig-
ious participation.  Very little would violate the Establishment
Clause under this approach, which would emphasize judicial def-
erence to the government in its choices concerning religion.  Al-
though Chief Justice Rehnquist is no longer on the Court, there
is every reason to believe that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito take this position.  If a majority adopts the accommoda-
tionist approach, what will it mean for the law of the Establish-
ment Clause?
A. Religious Symbols on Government Property
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU , the Court considered two
different religious displays.  One was a creche (a representation
of the nativity of Jesus) that was placed in a display case in the
stairway of a county courthouse.  The other display was in front
of a government building and included a large Christmas tree, a
large menorah (a candleholder used as part of the Hanukkah cel-
ebration), and a sign saying that the city saluted liberty during
the holiday season.14  Four Justices—Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia,
and White—took an accommodationist approach and would
have allowed both displays.  Justice Kennedy wrote that “the
principles of the Establishment Clause and our Nation’s historic
traditions of diversity and pluralism allow communities to make
reasonable judgments respecting the accommodation or ac-
knowledgement of holidays with both cultural and religious as-
12 Lamb’s Chapel , 508 U.S. at 398-99 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (cita-
tions omitted).
13 See, e.g. , id.  at 399-400; Lee , 505 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting); County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 660-74 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
14 Allegheny , 492 U.S. at 579-81 (Blackmun, J., opinion).
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pects.”15  Under this approach, any religious symbol on
government property would be permissible.
The majority, however, did not take this approach.  Three Jus-
tices—Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall—took a strict separation
approach and argued that both displays should be deemed un-
constitutional as violating the Establishment Clause.  Justice Ste-
vens wrote that “the Establishment Clause should be construed
to create a strong presumption against the display of religious
symbols on public property.”16
Justices Blackmun and O’Connor used a neutrality approach—
specifically the symbolic endorsement test—finding the menorah
constitutional and the nativity scene unconstitutional.17  From
their perspective, the menorah was permissible because it was ac-
companied by a Christian symbol (a Christmas tree) and a secu-
lar expression concerning liberty.18  In contrast, the nativity
scene was alone on government property and thus was likely to
be perceived as symbolic endorsement of Christianity.19  Justice
O’Connor concluded that “the city of Pittsburgh’s combined hol-
iday display had neither the purpose nor the effect of endorsing
religion, but that Allegheny County’s creche display had such an
effect.”20  Thus, the result was five to four that the nativity scene
was unconstitutional but six to three that the menorah was
permissible.
In the Court’s most recent decisions concerning religious sym-
bols on government property—McCreary County v. ACLU of
Kentucky21 and Van Orden v. Perry22 —four Justices voted to al-
low two different Ten Commandments displays to remain on
government property.  Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas were clear in expressing their view
that religious symbols on government property do not violate the
15 Id. at 679 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
16 Id. at 650 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17 Id.  at 620 (Blackmun, J., opinion).
18 Id.  at 621 (plurality opinion joined by Justice O’Connor); see id.  at 620 (Black-
mun, J., opinion) (“[T]he city’s overall display must be understood as conveying the
city’s secular recognition of different traditions for celebrating the winter-holiday
season.”); id.  at 636 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
19 Id.  at 601 & n.51 (Blackmun, J., opinion).
20 Id. at 637 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
21 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
22 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
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Establishment Clause.  Indeed, at oral argument in the case, Jus-
tice Kennedy, with obvious frustration in his voice, said to me
that he did not understand why people who did not like the Texas
Ten Commandments display did not simply look away.  Of
course, by this view, the government could put any religious sym-
bol anywhere on government property.  Even a large cross atop a
city hall would not violate the Establishment Clause.
McCreary was a five-to-four decision with Justices Stevens,
O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in the majority holding
that two Ten Commandment displays within Kentucky court-
houses were unconstitutional.23 Van Orden  was also five to four
but allowed a Texas Ten Commandments monument outside the
Texas State Capitol.24  Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment
and provided the fifth vote to permit this.  Justice Breyer did not
see a six-feet-high, three-feet-wide Ten Commandments monu-
ment between the Texas State Capitol and the Texas Supreme
Court as symbolically endorsing religion.  He was clear that he
accepted the test adopted by the four dissenting justices—Ste-
vens, O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg—that the government
may not place religious symbols on government property if they
have the effect of endorsing religion.25  But Justice Breyer con-
cluded by saying that while he agreed with Justice O’Connor’s
statement of principles, he did not agree with her application in
this case.26
Now, though, with Justice O’Connor replaced by Justice Alito,
there likely are five votes to allow any and all religious symbols
on government property.
B. Aid to Religious Institutions
In Mitchell v. Helms ,27 a case decided in June 2000, four Jus-
tices called for altering the law of the Establishment Clause to
allow much more aid to parochial schools.  In an opinion joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, Jus-
tice Thomas argued that the Establishment Clause is violated by
aid to religion only if the government favors some religions over
others.28  This, in itself, would be a radical change in the Estab-
23 McCreary , 125 S. Ct. at 2740-41.
24 Van Orden , 125 S. Ct. at 2864.
25 Id.  at 2871 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
26 Id.  at 2872.
27 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
28 Id.  at 809-14.
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lishment Clause because it would allow an unprecedented
amount of aid to religious schools, with the only limit being that
the government may not discriminate among religions.
Justice Thomas, though, went even further and suggested that
precluding parochial schools from receiving aid was
impermissible:
[T]he inquiry into the recipient’s religious views required by a
focus on whether a school is pervasively sectarian is not only
unnecessary but also offensive.  It is well established, in nu-
merous other contexts, that courts should refrain from trolling
through a person’s or institution’s religious beliefs. . . .
[H]ostility to aid to pervasively sectarian schools has a shame-
ful pedigree that we do not hesitate to disavow.29
Following this approach would mean that denying religious
schools funding available to other schools, as has always been
required by the Establishment Clause, violates the Constitution.
Mitchell v. Helms  involved the issue of whether it violated the
Establishment Clause for the government to provide instruc-
tional equipment to religious schools.30  In earlier cases, the
Court had ruled that the government may not give instructional
equipment to parochial institutions if it is a type that likely could
be used for religious instruction.31  In Mitchell , six Justices re-
jected this limitation, though they did not agree on an alternative
test.
Justice Thomas’s plurality opinion, joined by Rehnquist, Scalia,
and Kennedy, could not be clearer in its call for allowing aid to
parochial schools so long as the government is evenhanded
among religions.  Justice Thomas wrote, “In short, nothing in the
Establishment Clause requires the exclusion of pervasively secta-
rian schools from otherwise permissible aid programs, and other
doctrines of this Court bar it.  This doctrine, born of bigotry,
should be buried now.”32
The majority of the Justices in Mitchell  rejected this approach
and explicitly recognized that it would be a radical and unprece-
dented shift in the law of the Establishment Clause.  Justice
O’Connor, in an opinion concurring in the judgment, observed,
“[W]e have never held that a government-aid program passes
29 Id . at 828 (citations omitted).
30 Id.  at 801.
31 See, e.g. , Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349 (1975).
32 Mitchell , 530 U.S. at 829.
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constitutional muster solely  because of the neutral criteria it em-
ploys as a basis for distributing aid.”33  Similarly, Justice Souter
in dissent wrote, “The insufficiency of evenhandedness neutrality
as a stand-alone criterion of constitutional intent or effect has
been clear from the beginning of our interpretative efforts
. . . .”34
Justice Thomas’s approach would profoundly change the law
because the Establishment Clause no longer would be a barrier
to government aid to religion or religious presence in govern-
ment.  For at least a half century, the Court always has regarded
the Establishment Clause as an affirmative limit on what the gov-
ernment may do, even if it is acting neutrally among religions.
Justice Thomas would reject that entirely.
Even more significantly, the implication of Justice Thomas’s
approach is that the government must  fund parochial school edu-
cation, at least to the extent that it provides any aid to private
secular schools.  Justice Thomas’s approach clearly implies that
excluding religion is not neutral and constitutes impermissible
discrimination under the Establishment Clause.
In fact, Justice Thomas argued that it is offensive for the gov-
ernment to even look to whether an organization is religious in
character.35  But if the government cannot consider religion in
distributing money, it will be required  to subsidize religious
schools on the same terms that it funds nonreligious ones.  Justice
Thomas acknowledges and endorses this:  “[T]he religious nature
of a recipient should not matter to the constitutional analysis, so
long as the recipient adequately furthers the government’s secu-
lar purpose.”36
Thus, Justice Thomas’s equality approach would not simply al-
low massive government aid to religious institutions, it would
mandate it.  Never before has a Justice suggested, let alone a plu-
rality endorsed, such a radical change in the law of the Establish-
ment Clause.
In future years the Supreme Court is likely to face major issues
concerning aid to religion.  These include the constitutionality of
school voucher programs and charitable choice programs that al-
low faith-based groups to receive government money to provide
33 Id.  at 839 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
34 Id.  at 884 (Souter, J., dissenting).
35 Id.  at 828 (plurality opinion).
36 Id.  at 827.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-2\ORE201.txt unknown Seq: 9  9-MAR-07 8:55
2006] Why Separate Church and State? 359
social services.  There are now five Justices—Chief Justice Rob-
erts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito—who are
willing to allow such aid so long as it does not discriminate
among religions.
C. Prayer in Schools
For almost forty years, the Supreme Court has said that prayer,
even voluntary prayer in public schools, is unconstitutional.37
Most recently, in the June 2000 case Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe ,38 the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional
student-delivered prayers at high school football games.39  This
case was decided by a six-to-three margin, with Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas dissenting.  Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, writing for the dissent, saw the majority’s opinion
as unjustified “hostility” to religion.40
However, and quite significantly, Justice Kennedy has been
unwilling to join the three most conservative Justices on the issue
of school prayer.  In addition to being in the majority in Santa Fe ,
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court in Lee v. Weis-
man , which declared that clergy-delivered prayers at public
school graduations are unconstitutional.41  In Lee , Justice Ken-
nedy emphasized the coercion inherent to such prayers.42  He did
not join Justice Scalia’s biting dissent that stressed accommodat-
ing those who desired to pray.43  Although Justice Kennedy joins
with the other conservatives in taking an accommodationist ap-
proach to the Establishment Clause, he is far more willing to find
coercion in the school context as evidenced by his opinion in Lee
and his position with the majority in Santa Fe .
Therefore, before the Court could overrule the many prece-
dents limiting prayer in public schools, likely another Justice
would have to be replaced from among Justices Stevens, Ken-
nedy, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg.
37 See, e.g. , Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
38 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
39 Id.  at 301.
40 Id.  at 318 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
41 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992).
42 Id.  at 592-94.
43 Id.  at 645 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Scalia’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas.
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II
WHY THERE SHOULD BE A WALL SEPARATING
CHURCH AND STATE
As described above, the conservative Justices on the Court
over the last two decades—Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas—have argued that the Establish-
ment Clause should be interpreted to accommodate religion.
The government would violate the Establishment Clause only if
it literally established a church, coerced religious participation, or
favored one religion over another.  The government would be
acting constitutionally by giving religion and secular activities
equal treatment and equal aid; disfavoring religion would violate
the Establishment Clause.
The fundamental flaw in this argument is that it fails to recog-
nize that religion is different from other beliefs under the Consti-
tution.  For example, Justice Thomas’s approach in Mitchell v.
Helms  is premised on the idea that religious schools should be
treated the same as secular ones and, more generally, that the
government should treat religion and nonreligion equally.44  But
this ignores the Constitution’s text and history as well as the so-
cial need for separating church and state.
The text of the Constitution expressly treats religion differ-
ently from any other set of beliefs in its prohibition of govern-
ment enacting a law respecting the establishment of religion or
abridging its free exercise.  This text is based on historical experi-
ence as to how religion often is used as a basis for discrimination
and persecution.45  Religion also is treated differently because of
a recognition of the profound role that religious beliefs play in a
person’s life.  Thus, the First Amendment should properly be in-
terpreted as requiring the government to stay out of religion and
religion to stay out of government.  Justice Thomas would oblit-
erate this fundamental principle and mandate that religion be
treated the same as all other beliefs and that government treat
religious institutions the same as all others.
The Establishment Clause serves many important purposes
that would be undermined by the approach likely to be taken by
the five conservative Justices.  First, the Establishment Clause
44 See 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2003).
45 See  Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 432-33 (1962); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 8-15 (1947).
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protects freedom of conscience by ensuring that people are not
taxed to support religions other than their own.  The famous
statement of Thomas Jefferson concerning the need for a wall
separating church and state and James Madison’s Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments  were written in the
context of opposing a state tax to aid the church.46
Jefferson spoke of the unconscionability of taxing people to
support religions that they do not believe in.  The Supreme Court
has described Jefferson’s belief that
to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and ty-
rannical; . . . even the forcing him to support this or that
teacher of his own religious persuasion is depriving him of the
comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to the particular
pastor, whose morals he would make his pattern. . . .47
Similarly Madison said, “[T]he same authority which can force a
citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the sup-
port of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any
other establishment . . . .”48
It is wrong to make people support a church that teaches that
their religion or beliefs are evil.  It violates their freedom of con-
science and forces them to support religions that they do not ac-
cept.  Likewise, Justice Souter has explained that “compelling an
individual to support religion violates the fundamental principle
of freedom of conscience.  Madison’s and Jefferson’s now famil-
iar words establish clearly that liberty of personal conviction re-
quires freedom from coercion to support religion, and this means
that the government can compel no aid to fund it.”49
But this is exactly what the conservative Justices’ approach to
the Establishment Clause would do.  It would mandate  that the
government subsidize parochial schools and religious social ser-
vices any time the government is providing aid for secular
schools and social services.  People would be required, through
their tax dollars, to pay for religious indoctrination, even relig-
ious teaching of hatred and intolerance.
Second, the Establishment Clause serves a fundamental pur-
pose of inclusion in that it allows all in society—of every religion
46 Madison’s Remonstrance  is reprinted in Everson , 330 U.S. at 63-72 app. (1947).
47 Everson , 330 U.S. at 13 (second omission in original) (quoting the Virginia Bill
for Religious Liberty).
48 Id.  at 65-66 app. (reprinting Madison’s Remonstrance).
49 Mitchell , 530 U.S. at 870 (Souter, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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and of no religion—to feel that the government is theirs.  When
the government supports religion, inescapably those of different
religions feel excluded.  Equality does not solve this.  In a society
that is overwhelmingly Christian, those of minority faiths are
meant to feel marginalized and unwelcome.  If equality were the
only constraint imposed by the Establishment Clause, a school
could begin each day with a prayer so long as every religion got
its due.  Assuming a school reflecting America’s religious diver-
sity, the vast majority of days would begin with Christian prayers.
Those with no religion would be made to feel that it was not their
school, as would those of minority religions who routinely were
subjected to prayers of Christian religions.
This goal of inclusion is central, not incidental, to the Estab-
lishment Clause.  Justice O’Connor has explained, “Direct gov-
ernment action endorsing religion or a particular religion is
invalid . . . because it ‘sends a message to nonadherents that they
are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and
an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, fa-
vored members of the political community.’”50
The pronouncement that there is an official religion makes all
of a different faith feel unwelcome.  They are made to feel that
they are tolerated guests, not equal members of the community.
The very core of the Establishment Clause prevents the govern-
ment from taking actions that divide people in this way.  The fo-
cus of the Establishment Clause is thus very much on the effect
of the message on the audience.  This helps to explain why Jus-
tice Scalia is simply wrong in his dissent in Lee v. Weisman ,
where he expresses the need to protect the majority in the audi-
ence who want to hear a prayer.51  The Establishment Clause is
about preventing the majority, through government power, from
making those of other religions feel unwelcome.  If the majority
of the audience wants to hear prayers, of course it may do so, but
not at an official government function, especially one where the
audience is compelled to be present.
The potential for this problem is much greater now than when
the First Amendment was adopted.  The country is much more
50 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring)).
51 505 U.S. 577, 645 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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religiously diverse today than it was in 1791.  Justice Brennan ob-
served in 1963 that
our religious composition makes us a vastly more diverse peo-
ple than were our forefathers.  They knew differences chiefly
among Protestant sects.  Today the Nation is far more hetero-
geneous religiously, including as it does substantial minorities
not only of Catholics and Jews but as well of those who wor-
ship according to no version of the Bible and those who wor-
ship no God at all.52
Equality does not cure this.  Those who disavow any religious
belief are forced to support all religions; indeed, they will be sur-
rounded with parochial schools supported by their tax dollars.
Forcing them to hear prayers of every religion inevitably makes
them feel unwelcome in their own schools and their own country.
The Establishment Clause should be interpreted to forbid these
practices.
This reasoning, of course, also explains why religious symbols
do not belong on government property.  A city hall with a large
cross on its roof makes those of different religions feel unwel-
come—that it is not their government. Van Orden v. Perry  was
important, and wrongly decided, because it allowed Texas to dis-
play a profoundly sectarian religious message at the seat of its
government.  Between the Texas State Capitol and the Texas Su-
preme Court is a six-feet-high, three-feet-wide monument with a
passage from the Bible that many religions regard as particularly
sacred.53  The monument has, in large letters, the words “I AM
the LORD thy God.”54  The first four Commandments listed—
“Thou shalt have no other gods before me,” “Thou shalt not
make to thyself any graven images,” “Thou shalt not take the
Name of the Lord thy God in vain,” and “Remember the Sab-
bath day, to keep it holy”—are religious mandates.55  There are
many versions of the Ten Commandments, and the one in Texas
is the Protestant version.56  The Texas monument, like others
donated around the country by the Fraternal Order of Eagles,
“[w]ith the exception of some minor word changes in the fourth
and fifth line of the text, dealing with graven images, . . . is ex-
52 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 240 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
53 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2858 (2005).
54 Id.  at 2873, 2891 app. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (photograph depicting
monument).
55 Id.  at 2873-74, 2891 app.
56 Id.  at 2879-80 & n.15.
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actly the same as in the King James Version of the Bible. . . .
[T]he structuring of the Commandments is identical to the Lu-
theran Catechism.”57
A person entering the Texas State Capitol or the Texas Su-
preme Court who is of a religion that does not view the Ten
Commandments as sacred text, or who is not Protestant, is made
to feel unwelcome.  She is made to feel an outsider.  This is ex-
actly what the Establishment Clause and the separation of church
and state were meant to prevent.
Third, the Establishment Clause protects religion from the
government.  If the government provides assistance, inescapably
there are and should be conditions attached.  For example, when
the government gives money, it must make sure that the funds
are used for their intended purpose.  This necessarily involves the
government placing conditions on the funds and monitoring how
they are spent.  Such government entanglement is a threat to
religion.
This concern is not new.  Roger Williams, for example, ex-
pressed great concern that “worldly corruptions . . . might con-
sume the churches if sturdy fences against the wilderness were
not maintained.”58  Justice Souter also expressed this as a funda-
mental basis for the Establishment Clause:
[G]overnment aid corrupts religion.  Madison argued that es-
tablishment of religion weakened the beliefs of adherents so
favored, strengthened their opponents, and generated “pride
and indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and servility in the la-
ity; [and] in both, superstition, bigotry and persecution.”  In a
variant of Madison’s concern, we have repeatedly noted that a
government’s favor to a particular religion or sect threatens to
taint it with “corrosive secularism.”59
Justice Thomas’s equality theory would mean that the govern-
57 Paul Finkelman, The Ten Commandments on the Courthouse Lawn and Else-
where , 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1477, 1493 (2005).  Indeed, “there are at least five
distinctive versions of the Decalogue.  In some cases the differences among them
might seem trivial or semantic, but lurking behind the disparate accounts are deep
theological disputes.”  Steven Lubet, The Ten Commandments in Alabama , 15
CONST. COMMENT. 471, 474 (1998) (footnote omitted).  For example, the Jewish ver-
sion of the First Commandment is “I the Lord am your God who brought you out of
the land of Egypt, the house of bondage.”  The Catholic version of the Second Com-
mandment does not prohibit graven images, whereas the Jewish version does pro-
hibit them. See  Finkelman, supra , at 1488-90.
58 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1158-60 (2d ed. 1988).
59 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 871 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (second al-
teration in original) (citations omitted).
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ment would be enmeshed in almost every aspect of religious
schools and religious institutions.  The government, as a condi-
tion for funding, could—and should—set curricula and educa-
tional requirements.  The government would need to monitor to
see if these mandates were met.  Thomas’s approach is a threat to
religion and it is no less so because all religions are threatened
equally.
Fourth, coercion is inherent without a separation of church and
state.  If supervisors in a government office hold prayer
breakfasts, even if they are voluntary, employees feel the pres-
sure to attend.  If schools have prayers, students feel pressure to
participate.
Government support for faith-based organizations has exactly
this effect.  For example, across the country, criminal defendants
increasingly are being placed in drug and alcohol rehabilitation
programs that are operated by religious institutions.60  Moreover,
many states have created drug courts where participation in drug
rehabilitation programs is an alternative to incarceration.61  Thus,
because of the federal government’s emphasis on allowing faith-
based programs to receive government funding, criminal defend-
ants increasingly are being placed in drug and alcohol rehabilita-
tion programs conducted by pervasively religious institutions.
For example, in recent years, the federal government has signifi-
cantly increased the availability of funds for drug and alcohol re-
habilitation programs and has expressly authorized faith-based
organizations to receive government money to provide these ser-
60 See, e.g. , Derek P. Apanovitch, Note, Religion and Rehabilitation:  The Requisi-
tion of God by the State , 47 DUKE L.J. 785, 786-89 (1998) (citing American Commu-
nity Renewal Act of 1997, S. 432, 105th Cong. (1997)).
61 See DRUG COURTS PROGRAM OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEFINING
DRUG COURTS:  THE KEY COMPONENTS 7 (1997) (“The mission of drug courts is to
stop the abuse of alcohol and other drugs and related criminal activity. Drug courts
offer a compelling choice for individuals whose criminal justice involvement stems
from AOD [Alcohol and Other Drug] use:  participation in treatment.  In exchange
for successful completion of the treatment program, the court may dismiss the origi-
nal charge, reduce or set aside a sentence, offer some lesser penalty, or offer a com-
bination of these.”); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBL’N NO. GAO-02-434,
DRUG COURTS:  BETTER DOJ DATA COLLECTION AND EVALUATION EFFORTS
NEEDED TO MEASURE IMPACT OF DRUG COURT PROGRAMS 27 (2002) (stating that
forty-eight states have drug court programs); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
PUBL’N NO. GAO-05-219, ADULT DRUG COURTS:  EVIDENCE INDICATES RECIDI-
VISM REDUCTIONS AND MIXED RESULTS FOR OTHER OUTCOMES 1 (2005) (“Drug
court programs have become popular nationwide in the criminal justice system.  As
of September 2004, there were over 1,200 drug court programs operating in addition
to about 500 being planned.”).
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vices.62  Similarly, criminal defendants who have abused alcohol,
such as in drunk-driving cases, are increasingly being diverted to
treatment and rehabilitation programs commonly conducted by
religious groups.63  For example, a criminal defendant often must
participate in programs such as Alcoholics Anonymous and Nar-
cotics Anonymous, programs in which faith and God play a cen-
tral role in treatment.64
All of this inevitably pressures criminal defendants to partici-
pate in religious activities, frequently of religions different from
their own.  To avoid prison, a defendant will have to go to a relig-
ious treatment program that includes indoctrination in a specific
religion.  And within prison, inmates are placed in programs that
are completely sectarian.  For example, recently a federal district
court in Americans United for Separation of Church and State v.
Prison Fellowship Ministries65 invalidated such a program as vio-
lating the Establishment Clause.66  The court found that it vio-
lated the Establishment Clause for an organization to provide
prerelease rehabilitation services to inmates through a program
based on Evangelical Christianity.67  Inevitably, inmates were
pressured to participate in religions they did not accept or be-
lieve in.68
A separation of church and state prevents coercion.  The Su-
62 See Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet:  Providing Help to Heal
Americans Struggling with Addiction (Jan. 30, 2003), available at  http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030130-22.html. (“In his State of the Union Ad-
dress, President Bush announced a three-year, $600 million federal treatment initia-
tive to help addicted Americans find needed treatment from the most effective
programs, including faith-based and community-based organizations.”).
63 See  Rachel F. Calabro, Comment, Correction Through Coercion:  Do State
Mandated Alcohol and Drug Treatment Programs in Prisons Violate the Establish-
ment Clause? , 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 565, 565-67 (1998); Michael G. Honeymar, Jr.,
Note, Alcoholics Anonymous as a Condition of Drunk Driving Probation:  When
Does It Amount to Establishment of Religion? , 97 COLUM. L. REV. 437, 437-38
(1997).
64 See, e.g. , NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA
UNIV., SO HELP ME GOD:  SUBSTANCE ABUSE, RELIGION AND SPIRITUALITY 24
(2001) (“Twelve-Step programs such as Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) or Narcotics
Anonymous (NA) rely on spiritual concepts and methods to support individuals
seeking to abstain from substance use. . . . The spiritual basis of a 12-Step program is
apparent in its tenets which begin with an acknowledgment of God or a higher
power.”).
65 432 F. Supp. 2d 862 (S.D. Iowa 2006).
66 Id.  at 925.
67 Id.  at 922.
68 See id.  at 891-914 (describing the benefits enjoyed by inmates participating in
Christian-based rehabilitation program).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-2\ORE201.txt unknown Seq: 17  9-MAR-07 8:55
2006] Why Separate Church and State? 367
preme Court long has held that coercing a person into participat-
ing in religious activities violates the core of both the Free
Exercise and the Establishment Clauses.69  Yet, without a separa-
tion of church and state, coercion—whether in schools, prisons,
or elsewhere—is inevitable.
CONCLUSION
I have no doubt that when historians look back at the end of
the twentieth century and the early years of the twenty-first, they
will point to the rise of fundamentalism as the most important
development across the world.  This has manifested itself in the
United States, as in other nations, in those who want religion to
be much more a part of government.
It now appears that there are five Justices on the Supreme
Court who will allow this to happen.  I believe that this is terribly
misguided and at odds with the Establishment Clause’s mandate
for a wall separating church and state.  Justice O’Connor ex-
pressed this eloquently when she wrote:
Reasonable minds can disagree about how to apply the Relig-
ion Clauses in a given case.  But the goal of the Clauses is
clear:  to carry out the Founders’ plan of preserving religious
liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society.  By
enforcing the Clauses, we have kept religion a matter for the
individual conscience, not for the prosecutor or bureaucrat.
At a time when we see around the world the violent conse-
quences of the assumption of religious authority by govern-
ment, Americans may count themselves fortunate:  Our regard
for constitutional boundaries has protected us from similar
travails, while allowing private religious exercise to flourish.
. . . Those who would renegotiate the boundaries between
church and state must therefore answer a difficult question:
Why would we trade a system that has served us so well for
one that has served others so poorly?70
69 See, e.g. , Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (stating that religious coer-
cion violates Establishment Clause); Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or.
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (stating that religious coercion violates Free Exer-
cise Clause).
70 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2746 (2005) (O’Connor, J.
concurring).
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